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Abstract
This article analyses the role of diﬀerent kinds of information for minimizing or eliminating the risks due to the production, use, and
disposal of chemical substances and contrasts it with present and planned (informational) regulation in the United States and the
European Union, respectively. Some commentators who are disillusioned with regulatory approaches have argued that informational
tools should supplantmandatory regulatorymeasures unﬂatteringly described as ‘‘command and control.’’ Critics of this reformist view
are concernedwith the lack of technology-innovation forcing that results from informational policies alone.Weargue that informational
tools can be made more technology inducinge and thus more oriented towards environmental innovationse than they are under cur-
rent practices, with orwithout complementary regulatorymechanisms, although a combination of approachesmay yield the best results.
The conventional approach to chemicals policy envisions a sequential process that includes three steps of (1) producing or collect-
ing risk-relevant information, (2) performing a risk assessment or characterization, followed by (3) risk management practices, often
driven by regulation. We argue that such a sequential process is too static, or linear, and spends too many resources on searching for,
or generating information about present hazards, in comparison to searching for, and generating information related to safer alter-
natives which include input substitution, ﬁnal product reformulation, and/or process changes. These pollution prevention or cleaner
technology approaches are generally acknowledged to be superior to pollution control. We argue that the production of risk infor-
mation necessary for risk assessment, on the one hand, and the search for safer alternatives on the other hand, should be approached
simultaneously in two parallel quests. Overcoming deﬁcits in hazard-related information and knowledge about risk reduction alter-
natives must take place in a more synchronized manner than is currently being practiced. This parallel approach blurs the alleged
bright line between risk assessment and risk management, but reﬂects more closely how regulatory agencies actually approach the
regulation of chemicals.
These theoretical considerations are interpreted in the context of existing and planned informational tools in the United States and
the European Union, respectively. The current political debate in the European Union concerned with reforming chemicals policy and
implementing the REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals) system is focused on improving the production
and assessment of risk information with regard to existing chemicals, although it also contains some interesting risk management
elements. To some extent, REACHmirrors the approach taken in the United States under the Toxics Substances Control Act (TSCA)
of 1976. TSCA turned out not to be eﬀectively implemented and provides lessons that should be relevant toREACH. In this context, we
discuss the opportunities and limits of existing and planned informational tools for achieving risk reduction.
 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Chemicals are ubiquitous in manifold applications of
our daily life. They have diﬀerent properties and fulﬁl
a wide range of functions. However, apart from their in-
tended purposes, many chemicals also have unintended
adverse consequences for human health and the envi-
ronment. Thus, the production, use and disposal of
chemical substances are accompanied by ‘‘negative ex-
ternalities,’’ expressed as human and environmental
risks. These risks legitimate and sometimes require gov-
ernment action to ensure human and environmental
protection. For risk management purposes, basic infor-
mation is needed about hazards and exposures to poten-
tially harmful substances. The acquisition of suﬃcient
knowledge concerning negative eﬀects is necessary to
assess and manage risks. Adequate means are also re-
quired to force producers and manufacturers to reduce
risks in a cost-eﬀective way by adopting or developing
better safety measures that improve the production pro-
cess or substitute less- or non-hazardous substances by
safer alternatives.
Due to the existence of externalities of chemical pro-
duction, use, and disposal, informational tools alone,
without complementary remediating measures, are not
expected to achieve an internalization of these adverse
eﬀects by the ﬁrms.1 Often, additional needed regulatory
measures are not likely to be created or enforced, and
informational tools2 can at most only partially mitigate
the problems connected with chemicals’ hazards and
risks (see [12]). We focus here on the role of diﬀerent
types of information in chemicals policy either as pre-
cedent and complementary to regulatory policy e or
to economic-based incentives e or as a self-standing
policy.
1.1. Types of information
In considering the eﬀects of information on risk re-
duction, it is necessary to distinguish between diﬀerent
types of information. The risk management process
conventionally includes the three sequential steps of
(1) producing or collecting risk-relevant information,
(2) performing a risk assessment, followed by (3) risk
management practices. The ﬁrst two steps are necessary
to overcome the problem of informational deﬁcits,
1 In the special case where only the buyer/user of a product is aﬀected
by the hazards of contained substances, informational asymmetries
may exist between seller and buyer, but external eﬀects may be absent.
In this case, it has been argued that informational tools can theoretically
compensate market failures without additional regulatory measures.
2 Informational tools have been described as ‘‘the third wave’’ of
environmental policy, following command-and-control and
market-based instruments.whereas the third step of risk management refers to
the mitigation of the external eﬀects in terms of hazards
and risks.3
Categories of information, which are useful in terms
of this process, are scientiﬁc information, technological
information, and legal information (see [7, p. 311]). Sci-
entiﬁc information encompasses (1) product ingredients
and the speciﬁc composition of pollution in air, water,
soil, and waste, (2) the inherent toxicity and safety haz-
ard of the related chemicals, materials, and industrial
processes, and (3) information related to exposure of
various vulnerable groups to harmful substances and
processes. Technological information includes (1) moni-
toring technologies, (2) options for controlling or pre-
venting pollution, waste, and chemical accidents, and
(3) available substitute inputs, ﬁnal products, and pro-
cesses. Legal information refers to notiﬁcation of the
informational and other rights and obligations of pro-
ducers, employers, consumers, workers, and the general
public. Though important, legal information is not
a fundamental type of information, but rather the (man-
dated) diﬀusion of information about rights and duties
stemming from the nature and exposure proﬁles of haz-
ardous substances and processes, and options for their
control.
All types of information are potentially helpful in
identifying and reducing the risk of hazardous substan-
ces. Knowing the costs, time horizons to acquire infor-
mation, and asymmetries in accessing or holding of
information by government,4 it is important to focus
on the diminishing marginal utility of using resources
to acquire more information of each type. Moreover,
industry and other stakeholders are all important
participants in determining how eﬀective diﬀerent
(information) policies might be expected to be in reduc-
ing health and environmental risks. Therefore, the appli-
cation and usefulness of diﬀerent kinds of information
in diﬀerent stages of the risk management process will
be considered.
1.2. The risk management process and problems
with a sequential process
Scientiﬁc information basically refers to the two
steps of production and assessment of information con-
cerning the identity of, and exposure to, hazards. Pro-
duction and assessment of risk information are costly
3 With regard to the large amount of existing chemicals which have
not been adequately tested, an additional step of priority setting
ranked by expected severity is useful. Diﬀerent ways of priority setting,
as well as their advantages and disadvantages, will not be discussed in
this paper, but see [4].
4 For a detailed analysis with regard to the problems of generating
and distributing risk information see [21].
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tion asymmetries between ﬁrms and government, as
well as among other stakeholders, because the produc-
ing ﬁrms are generally acknowledged to have easier
access to risk information of substances that they
produce. Thus it is useful and commonplace to require
the necessary information from the producing ﬁrms.
Were it not for mandatory requirements, the ﬁrms
would have disincentives to produce as well as to dif-
fuse information about hazards and risks, because
this could endanger their production opportunities
and sales e even though those potentially exposed ex-
pect those substances to be safe.5 The correctness and
completeness of risk information produced by the ﬁrms
correlate directly with the capacity of the government
or other stakeholders to audit the information. This
process is inﬂuenced by two considerations: ﬁrstly, it
is important to construct regulatory informational
measures in such a way that accurate and complete
risk information is produced and disclosed. Secondly,
the testing requirements for the ﬁrms should not un-
necessarily burden the production of substances due
to the associated costs of producing those data.
The process of producing risk information is embod-
ied in risk assessment: ‘‘a way of ordering, structuring
and interpreting existing information with the aim of
creating a qualitatively new type of information, namely
estimations on the likelihood (or probability) of the oc-
currence of adverse eﬀects’’ [24, p. 135]. Risk assessment
involves four steps6:
- hazard identiﬁcation
- doseeresponse assessment
- exposure assessment
- risk characterization
Within the ﬁrst two steps, existing hazards (e.g., tox-
icity, ﬂammability, etc.) of a substance are analyzed
and the quantitative relationship between diﬀerent
levels of exposure and health/environmental eﬀects is
determined. The Probable No-Eﬀect Concentration
(PNEC) (i.e., the no-eﬀect threshold) or No Observed
Adverse Eﬀect Level (NOAEL) for diﬀerent exposure
pathways and media are identiﬁed. However, the rela-
tion between dose and (hazardous) response is not
easy to determine. Furthermore, tests for eﬀects on
human are conducted on animals, which often react
5 To the extent that regulatory requirements impose a responsibility
to disseminate risk-relevant information, rather than to generate infor-
mation, the resulting disincentive to produce useful information could
have serious consequences. See [7, chapter 7].
6 See [30].diﬀerently to the same exposure (see [24, p. 139]).
Moreover, it is diﬃcult to assess the eﬀects of low ex-
posures over a long period of time. This often cannot
be simulated by animal testing with high exposures
over a shorter period. Therefore, long-term and chronic
eﬀects often cannot be accurately predicted. Thus, the
data are usually highly uncertain vis-a`-vis human health
risks.7
Exposure assessment refers to the (temporal) de-
scription of the amount and concentration of a sub-
stance that is released to diﬀerent media over time by
production, use and disposal and that leads to human
and environmental exposure and uptake. From this,
the Predicted Environmental Concentration (PEC)
and Biologically-Relevant Dose (BRD) are determined.
In general, a comprehensive exposure assessment is
hardly possible. The ﬁnal step of risk characteri-
zation relates the PNEC to the PEC and BRD, to
determine whether e and to what extent e the expo-
sure exceeds the thresholds of diﬀerent pathways of
exposure and biological action. In this case, risk assess-
ment may be followed by risk management, a process
that heroically assumes that a bright line can be
drawn between the assessment of risk and the decision
whether and to what extent to reduce (i.e., manage)
that risk.
However, quantitative risk assessment presents major
challenges and is e depending on the tests required for
risk assessment for several endpoints e costly and
time-consuming as well. Due to the arguments men-
tioned above, a comprehensive risk assessment is prob-
lematic. Thus, uncertainty vis-a`-vis hazards and risks
of substances often cannot be easily overcome by more
risk information and risk assessment. It is also ques-
tionable whether better future science can reduce uncer-
tainty suﬃciently and thereby create a more certain
basis for risk management.8 Uncertainty will also be ag-
gravated by the problem of not adequately accounting
for possible combined eﬀects/interactions between dif-
ferent substances. In contrast, an initial rough estima-
tion of potential risks is often possible, based on
readily-available fundamental information about certain
properties of chemicals. In this case, the analysis of
quantitative StructureeActivity Relationships (SARs)
of substances gains signiﬁcance, because the information
is readily available, is far less expensive, and is predictive
7 See also [23, p. 79] concerning the uncertainty of the data.
8 This statement reﬂects the inherent limitations of risk assessment.
Of course, conducting toxicological or epidemiological studies where
there are little or no prior data does reduce uncertainty to a point.
See [5, 2nd page].
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extent.9
It should be noted that due to the character of infor-
mation, its value often cannot be known before having
the information. It cannot be determined in advance
whether e or to what extent e additional testing signif-
icantly increases the knowledge of safety or lack of safety
of a substance and thus creates a better decision basis
for the risk management process. In general, the more
risk information that is required, the longer and more
costly the risk assessment is, and the longer it takes
before risk reductionmeasures can be implemented.How-
ever, a comprehensive risk assessment is often required
in European and American law before regulatory action
limiting the production, use, or disposal of the product
is justiﬁed. But the collection of these data neither re-
duces risks per se nor stimulates technological innova-
tion. Thus, we argue that an overly comprehensive and
protracted risk assessment process may unjustiﬁably post-
pone the implementation of desirable risk reduction
measures.
1.3. Making the case for a more balanced and
synchronized process
Relevant to the consideration of the timing e or the
right moment e for undertaking risk reduction meas-
ures are two types of risk management errors one might
make. A Type I error occurs when a substance is regu-
lated which later on turns out to be either not hazardous
or less hazardous than expected, whereas a Type II error
9 See, for example, [32]. In 1970s, with the beginning of mandatory
regulation in the United States, for example under the Clean Air Act
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, knowledge about struc-
tureeactivity relationships e i.e., the relationship between chemical
structure and toxic action e was limited. Substituting a chemical for
which little actual toxicity/epidemiological data existed, for a known
toxic material was very risky. Thirty-ﬁve years later, we have accumu-
lated a great deal of experience and our conﬁdence about clearly-safer
substitutes is much more soundly-based. Our chances of unfortunate
surprises are probably greatly diminished. A recent United States Gov-
ernment Accounting Oﬃce report stresses the increasing importance of
SARs (see [43]). The report observes: ‘‘.EPA predicts potential expo-
sure levels and toxicity of new chemicals by using scientiﬁc models and
by comparing them with chemicals with similar molecular structures
(analogues) for which toxicity information is available.EPA believes
that the models are generally useful as screening tools for identifying
potentially harmful chemicals.EPA believes that, based on limited
validation studies, its models are more likely to identify a false pos-
itive.than a false negative.’’ OECD member countries are currently
leading collaborative eﬀorts to develop and harmonize SAR methods
for assessing chemical hazards.
One further consideration is that our technological options are far
more varied than ‘‘drop-in’’ chemical substitutes. Alternative synthetic
pathways e the focus of ‘‘green chemistry’’ and ‘‘green engineering’’ e
allow us to alter inputs, change ﬁnal products, and use diﬀerent pro-
duction methods that eliminate or drastically reduce the probability
of harmful chemical releases and exposures (see [2,3,9]).occurs when a suspected hazardous substance is not reg-
ulated and it turns out to be hazardous or more hazard-
ous than expected [5,45]. Undertaking a comprehensive
risk assessment (and delaying in taking a risk man-
agement decision) could substantially minimize Type I
errors, whereas risk management at an early stage of
knowledge about potential risks minimizes the likeli-
hood of Type II errors [19].
The avoidance of Type II errors also embodies the
precautionary principle. One formulation of the precau-
tionary principle is as follows: ‘‘Where there are threats
of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-eﬀective measures to prevent environmental degra-
dation.’’10 Thus, essential conditions for applying the
precautionary principle are uncertainty and irreversibil-
ity.11 In contrast, avoidance of Type I errors presuppo-
ses that a substance is safe, until the opposite has been
shown.
Obviously, the relative merits of making a decision
between avoiding a Type I error and a Type II error
reﬂect a present trade-oﬀ based on currently limited
knowledge of the risks of both currently-used technol-
ogy and alternative technologies, and can hardly be
based on strictly quantitatively-rational criteria. The
regulatory authorities in the European Union and in
the United States historically have acted to avoid
Type I as well as Type II errors. The industrial pro-
ducers of chemicals are more concerned with avoiding
Type I errors, especially with regard to existing chem-
icals. In this context, a central question to consider is
whether it is possible to decrease the probability of
Type II errors, without signiﬁcantly increasing Type I
errors by appropriate information-enhancing activities.
In this regard, we argue that on the one hand a rough
comparative risk estimation of potential hazards of
alternative technologies (inputs, ﬁnal products, or pro-
cesses) to the technology presenting the putative hazard
under scrutiny is possible with relatively low-cost infor-
mation-enhancing activities, while, on the other hand,
a comprehensive and costly risk assessment of the pu-
tative hazard alone often does not signiﬁcantly increase
the certainty about risks. Note that comparative assess-
ments do not need to entail protracted risk assess-
ments, but rather a comparison of alternatives against
currently-used technologies. Thus, we argue later that
imposing a requirement for comparative analyses on the
proponents of a particular technology is not necessarily
a burdensome one.
10 Principle 15 of the Declaration of the 1992 UN Conference on
Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration).
11 For an extension of the criteria for the application of the precau-
tionary principle see also [5].
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‘‘[Risk management] attempts to develop a suitable
response to a hazard, taking into account all relevant
regulatory, political, environmental, engineering and so-
cial factors which might be relevant.’’12 Risk manage-
ment is based on a described scientiﬁc risk assessment
as well as upon a socio-economic assessment of alterna-
tive measures to reduce risks. The socio-economic risk
assessment is incorporated into a special case of coste
beneﬁt-analysis and is termed riskebeneﬁt analysis.13
Within these analyses, all relevant costs and beneﬁts of
a risk reduction measure are accounted for e starting
from a baseline without any regulatory action e and
converted into a single unit (usually money) for compar-
ison of both beneﬁts and costs. The consideration be-
tween risks and costs for risk reduction is combined
with several normative decisions within present trade-
oﬀs. There is no inherently unique value of risk reduc-
tion, but it is always determined by political and
societal weighting. What is supposed to be a reasonable
or unreasonable risk e or an ‘‘acceptable risk’’ e reﬂects
a normative basis. By converting several costs and ben-
eﬁts into a single unit, diﬀerent normative decisions
must be made, e.g., evaluating environmental and health
damages and choosing an adequate discount rate for fu-
ture damages. By taking only the social costs and bene-
ﬁts into account, distributional eﬀects are often not
considered. The assumptions that are taken for compen-
sating remaining uncertainties with regard to risks and
costs are also of great importance. The problems of
risk-beneﬁt studies in general and arguments for using
instead trade-oﬀ-analysis, which leaves all costs and
beneﬁts in their original units as well as considers the
distribution of costs and beneﬁts and thus does not ob-
scure the present trade-oﬀs of risk reduction measures,
are comprehensively discussed elsewhere by one of the
authors (see [4 (p. 70), 5]).
What we emphasize here, instead, is the signiﬁcance
of examining or obtaining information about the ex-
pected costs and risks of risk reduction measures (risk
control/reduction technologies, as well as safer alterna-
tives) (see [5, p. 5]). When hazards are expected to exist,
it is useful to force the search for safer alternatives at an
early stage of the process, instead of undertaking a com-
prehensive risk assessment process ﬁrst.14 This implies
12 See [40].
13 Whereas the United States has a tradition of applying costebeneﬁt
analysis before implementing regulatory measures, in Europe the dis-
cussion about a stronger application of costebeneﬁt approaches is
a more recent and an increasingly recommended practice.
14 The REACH proposal envisions that EU member regulators will
consider alternatives only after substances are determined not to be
‘‘adequately controlled’’, and the burden of demonstrating the exis-
tence and eﬃcacy of alternatives is on the regulators, not the producer,
although the proponents of substitutes are invited to make their case.a change from performing an extensive risk assessment
of the putatively hazardous substance to undertaking
at an early stage, a comparative risk assessment of known
risks of other substances and processes is known to be
characterized by recognized safer options and known
costs15 for their application. This process involves a syn-
chronized and iterative process involving the three steps
of risk information production, risk assessment and the
selection of risk management options. To illustrate this,
diﬀerent scenarios can be distinguished:
(1) The present substance is either known to be safe or
known to be unsafe in a well-characterized manner:
This causes neither a problem with a sequential nor
with a more synchronized approach.
(2) The present substance is known to be unsafe but lack-
ing important details/characterization:
In this case, following a sequential process creates
cost and time problems. Instead of analyzing the
lack of safety in detail, it may be more useful to start
a comparative socio-economic risk assessment.
Whether to explore alternative solutions depends
on the costs and beneﬁts (risk advantages) of various
control options, including but not limited to input or
ﬁnal product substitution. On the risk side, if the
risks associated with the existing alternatives are un-
certain, a determination must be made of whether to
undertake a process to (1) further clarify the risks of
the original substance/chemical, (2) clarify the risks
of the existing alternatives or (3) instead to search
for (or design) clearly-safer alternatives. On the cost
side, if control or risk reduction is expensive, it may
be very usefule and cost savinge to search for alter-
natives, preferably e but not necessarily e at consid-
erably cheaper costs that control the original hazard.
The necessity for shifting the information activities
away from expanding our knowledge about risk e
and towards elucidating risk reduction measures and
search for information about safer alternatives and
subsequent application of known alternatives e
depends on the societal costebeneﬁt calculus of the
values of diﬀerent kinds of information. Simply put,
the strategic question becomes one of whether risk
of the original substance/chemical or existing alterna-
tives should be further clariﬁed, or new technical
options should be explored instead. Even if shifting
15 If the safer alternatives are in existence or use, even if in a minority
of cases, costs will be known. If the safer alternatives still need to be
developed, it could be argued that they could be of unknown cost or
likely to be expensive. History, however, shows that regulations that
force the development of new technologies are three to ﬁve times
cheaper than industry alleges [44] and that technology-forcing leads
to many opportunities to modernize production processes that often
yields cost and other savings [6,34,35]. Here, too, absolute cost esti-
mates are not necessary, but rather comparative cost analysis.
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products or process changes) is more expensive, its
adoption could be justiﬁed because of the greater cer-
tainty of lower risks from clearly-safer substitutes.
(3) The hazardous nature of the present substance is
uncertain:
In this case it is necessary to specify the kind and ex-
tent of the uncertainty. Starting from the properties
of a substance, an assessment of the hazardous po-
tential of a substance is fundamental. If a substance
contains hazardous potential, a synchronized pro-
cess of further risk assessment, and comparative
risk and cost analyses of substitute technologies, as
described under scenario (2) is useful.
Comparative cost and risk assessments in this discus-
sion thus mean a rough assessment of costs and risks be-
tween (1) continuing present production (or starting
production) and (2) pursuing future alternatives. Due
to the uncertainties associated with scientiﬁc risk assess-
ment, the socio-economic-risk assessment could involve
even more uncertainties where not only the risks are un-
certain, but so are the costs and eﬀects of risk reduction
measures.
Given that no Type I error (i.e., regulating a clearly
non-hazardous substance) was [yet] made, and assuming
that new products or processes that are expected to be
safer will be developed/identiﬁed and applied by the
ﬁrms, two types of error can occur in adopting substi-
tute technologies. First, the new technology could turn
out to be no safer e or even more hazardous than the
former one e (an environmental risk error), and second,
the new technology is not able to fulﬁl the same func-
tionality (a technological function error). The substitu-
tion of presently existing products and processes
therefore could create both future technological and en-
vironmental risks. In practice, this could stiﬂe their sub-
stitution for hazardous substances. Developing and
implementing alternative products and processes could
be a diﬃcult process. Both incurring the costs of substi-
tution and introducing new risks remain problems.
However, depending on the nature of the uncertainties
of the risks, undertaking comparative risk assessments
on substitutes could be easier (and certainly less contro-
versial) in some cases. For example, the substitutes
could create smaller toxicological risks, or equivalent
toxicological risks, but not ﬂammability risks associated
with the original substance/chemical.
Finally, a conventional sequential risk management
process postpones risk management measures, but
sometimes not by signiﬁcantly decreasing uncertainty
with regard to the risks of chemical substances. There-
fore, it is useful to establish the steps of the risk manage-
ment process in a more synchronized way. Instead of
ﬁrst doing a comprehensive risk assessment of existing
chemicals, it may be more reasonable to start the processof comparative risk assessment and risk management
earlier and thus encourage the development and adop-
tion of safer (and cheaper) alternatives. Thus, when haz-
ards are expected to exist, the focus does not lie
exclusively in revealing all present hazards of a sub-
stance, but creating knowledge about future alterna-
tives. This means a shift of focus from scientiﬁc
information to technological options information.
Unlike a hazard, risk, or technology assessment, tech-
nology options analysis seeks to identify where and what
superior technologies could be adopted to eliminate the
possibility, or to dramatically reduce the probability,
of pollution and accidental releases.16 Ashford [5]
explains:
In order to facilitate pollution prevention or the shift to
cleaner technologies, options for technological change
must be articulated and evaluated according to multi-
variate criteria, including economic, environmental and
health/safety factors.[T]rade-oﬀ analysis.can be
used to document the aspects of the diﬀerent technology
options and, further, it can be used to compare improve-
ments that each option might oﬀer over existing techno-
logical solutions. The identiﬁcation of these options and
their comparison against the technology in use is what
constitutes Technology Options Analysis (TOA). Horn-
stein [25] points out that ‘‘it is against the range of pos-
sible solutions that the economist analyzes the eﬃciency
of existing risk levels’’ and that ‘‘to fashion government
programs based on a comparison of existing preferences
can artiﬁcially dampen the decision makers’ actual pref-
erence for changes were government only creative
enough to develop alternative solutions to problems’’
[25].
At ﬁrst blush, it might appear that TOA is nothing more
than a collection of multivariate impact assessments for
existing industrial technology and alternative options.
However, it is possible to bypass extensive cost, environ-
mental, health and safety, and other analyses or model-
ling by performing comparative analyses of these factors
(such as comparative technological performance and rel-
ative risk and ecological assessment). Comparative
16 A risk assessment, in practice, is generally limited to an evaluation
of the risks associated with the ﬁrm’s established production technol-
ogy and does not include the identiﬁcation or consideration of alterna-
tive production technologies that may be environmentally-sounder or
inherently-safer than the ones currently being employed. Consequently,
risk assessments tend to emphasize pollution control or secondary
accident prevention and mitigation strategies, which impose engineer-
ing and administrative controls on an existing production technology,
rather than primary prevention strategies, which utilize input substitu-
tion and process redesign to modify a production technology. In con-
trast to a risk assessment, a technology options analysis would expand
the evaluation to include alternative production technologies and
would facilitate the development of primary pollution and accident
prevention strategies.
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absolute quantiﬁcation of variables, are likely to be
less sensitive to initial assumptions than, for example,
costebeneﬁt analysis, and will enable easier identiﬁca-
tion of winewin options. Thus, while encompassing
a greater number of technological options than simple
technology assessment (TA), the actual analysis would
be easier and probably more believable.
TOAs can identify technologies used in a majority of
ﬁrms that might be diﬀused into greater use, or technol-
ogies that might be transferred from one industrial sec-
tor to another. In addition, opportunities for technology
development (i.e., innovation) can be identiﬁed. Gov-
ernment might merely require the ﬁrms or industries to
undertake a TOA. On the other hand, government
might either ‘‘force’’ or assist in the adoption or devel-
opment of new technologies. If government takes on
the role of merely assessing (through TA) new technolo-
gies that industry itself decided to put forward, it may
miss the opportunity to encourage superior technologi-
cal options. Only by requiring ﬁrms to undertake TOAs,
or undertaking TOAs itself, is government likely to
facilitate major technological change. Both industry
and government have to be suﬃciently technologically
literate to ensure that the TOAs are sophisticated and
comprehensive.
Encouraging technological change may have payoﬀs, not
only with regard to environmental goals, but also to en-
ergy, workplace safety, and other such goals [8]. Because
many diﬀerent options might be undertaken, the payoﬀs
are somewhat open-ended. Hence, looking to prioritize
diﬀerent problem areas cannot be the same kind of exer-
cise as a risk-assessment-based approach. A fraction of
the amount of money devoted to a single animal study
could instead yield some rather sophisticated knowledge
concerning what kinds of technology options exist or are
likely in the future. Expert technical talent in engineering
design and product development (through green chemis-
try or green engineering) can no doubt produce valuable
information and identify fruitful areas for investment in
technology development [3,2].
1.5. Informational tools for an orientation towards
safer alternatives
For reaching a more synchronized risk management
process, risk reduction measures are needed which
push ﬁrms eﬀorts towards the search for safer alterna-
tives at an early stage. Where regulatory tools are not
implemented or enforceable, it is useful to explore the
limits and opportunities of informational tools. As dis-
cussed earlier, informational tools can be based on the
three types of information e scientiﬁc, technologicaland legal information e with diﬀerent eﬀects. Question-
ing the importance of scientiﬁc information as a precon-
dition for risk management measures has been discussed
above in detail. The availability and the assessment of
scientiﬁc information alone does not reduce risks, with-
out complementary risk reduction measures. Thus, in-
formational tools useful for risk management should
be based on technological information as well. This
mainly includes:
(1) Requirements for ﬁrms to disclose risk information to
the public. Here, the disclosure refers to the exposure
proﬁles of produced substances and to their toxicity,
ﬂammability etc. Information disclosure creates the
opportunity for the public to react and avoid expo-
sure to existing hazards and risks by, e.g., changing
consumer behaviour or applying pressure on ﬁrms.
These can be eﬀective parts of the risk management
process, without making risk reduction measures
obligatory for the ﬁrms.17 Information regulation
can help lessen the need for more formal regulatory
risk reduction requirements. Information disclosure
can motivate ﬁrms to search for safer alternatives
by public or market pressure.18 The eﬀectiveness of
information disclosure depends on the informational
value for diﬀerent stakeholders, and their reaction
on the information. This is discussed later in the con-
text of the Toxic Release Inventory in the United
States.
(2) Requirements for the ﬁrms to identify and generate
technological options to reduce existing risks. This in-
formational requirement obligates ﬁrms to go be-
yond reporting what they have done in the past to
reduce risks. A more far-reaching requirement is to
require the ﬁrms to focus on future options for de-
veloping and implementing safer alternatives. This
can take place e.g., by having the ﬁrm undertake
a technological options analysis. By being required
to think about alternatives, ﬁrms increase their ca-
pacities to undertake changes.19
(3) Complementary informational tools include databases
of preferred and disfavoured technologies, as well as
labels for safe or hazardous products (or processes).
‘‘Negative’’ lists can increase the pressure on ﬁrms,
that use these substances (analogous to (1)), whereas
positive lists increase their capacity to substitute haz-
ardous substances or processes (analogous to (2)).
Although important as well, these tools will not be
discussed here.
17 See [27].
18 It has been suggested that increased requirements for risk assess-
ment under REACH may have this eﬀect. See later discussion.
19 See later discussion in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of the eﬀectiveness for
stimulating technological change of diﬀerent reporting requirements
that divulge cleaner production/pollution prevention practices.
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the European Union
In the ﬁrst section of this article, it was argued that
implementing risk management practices at an early
stage, instead of trying ﬁrst to overcome the existing
lack of information concerning the riskiness of chemical
substances/processes, could be a more productive ap-
proach. Achieving risk management goals using infor-
mational tools has been suggested where regulatory
measures are not implemented or are not likely to be
enforced. Therefore, it is useful to distinguish diﬀerent
informational tools vis-a`-vis their potential to strengthen
risk management. This section describes the strengths
and weaknesses of the legal frameworks in the United
States and the European Union, focussing on informa-
tional requirements to collect data on chemical substan-
ces as well as to implement risk reduction measures.20
Due to the fact that the restriction or ban of substances
is used only very rarely e although more often in the
European Union than in the United States e we will
argue that alternative informational tools could compen-
sate for the lack of stringent regulatory risk reduction
measures.21
While in the United States, as well as in the Euro-
pean Union, regulations creating testing obligations
for new chemicals22 were implemented in the seventies,
no routine tests were required for chemicals which
were already on the market e the so called ‘‘existing
chemicals’’. The vast majority of the substances on
the market e over 90% e are existing substances
[49, p. 11]. Therefore, the diﬀerent ways of data collec-
tion and risk management especially with regard to the
existing chemicals will be highlighted here,23 although
the United States and the European Union also diﬀer
in their legal frameworks for new chemicals. Due to
the fact that European directives have to be imple-
mented into the national legal frameworks, there are
also diﬀerences between the member states. Notwith-
standing these diﬀerences, the description here occasion-
ally refers to the German implementation of European
law.
20 See [43] for a comparison of United States European Union, and
Canadian approaches to testing chemicals.
21 Here we do not focus on laws that regulate hazardous emissions to
water, air, waste, etc., although these laws are also helpful for reducing
the production, consumption and disposal of hazardous substances.
22 These regulations refer to chemicals, which were not regulated
under other acts such as pesticides, nuclear material, food additives,
drugs, cosmetics, alcohol and tobacco.
23 There also exist many programs on the national as well as interna-
tional level to overcome the lack of knowledge with regard to existing
chemicals e most of them voluntary e which are not considered here.2.1. Legal framework in the European Union
The current legal framework for new chemicals in the
European union is based on the 6th amendment (issued
in 1979) of the Council Directive 67/548/EEC. Those
substances, produced before 1981 had to be registered
in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial
Chemical Substances (EINECS) without any further
testing obligations. EINECS contains 100,106 entries.
The latest data from the European Commission’s Joint
Research Centre [33] indicates that the numbers of sub-
stances in the diﬀerent tonnage categories are as follows:
 1e10 t/y (tonnes per annum) e 17,500 substances
 10e100 t/y e 4977 substances
 100e1000 t/y e 2641 substances
 O1000 t/y e 7204 substances (High Production Vol-
ume Chemicals)
Within the implementation of the directive in Ger-
many, there was also codiﬁed legal possibility for the
authorities to require tests for existing chemicals, in
case of supposed hazards. This legal possibility was never
applied. Instead there was chosen a cooperative way to
work up the information deﬁcit with regard to existing
chemicals, which will not be discussed here.24 The other
EU member states mostly abandoned work on this
problem until the promulgation of a joint regulation in
1993. The unequal treatment of new and existing chemi-
cals is considered as having a negative impact on the in-
novation of new chemicals. This is due to the testing
costs for new chemicals, which increases the incentive
to ﬁnd new applications for existing chemicals instead
of inventing and registering new (and safer) ones.
In 1993, the European Union implemented the Exist-
ing Substances Regulation (EC Regulation 93/793) to
overcome the lack of knowledge with regard to the
properties (hazards) and uses of existing chemicals.
The regulation required some producers, manufacturers
and importers to present a base data set for existing
chemicals. The deadline for substances produced or
used in amounts greater than 1000 t/y was March 23,
1994 and for amounts greater than 10 t/y June 4, 1998.
On the basis of the data, the European Commission de-
veloped four priority lists, which include 141 existing
high-volume chemicals. For each chemical a member
state was chosen to be responsible for the risk assess-
ment including risk management proposals, on the basis
of all available data within the ﬁrms about hazards and
exposition. Afterwards, the proposals of the member
states have to be discussed on the European level and
changed where required, until all member states agree
with it [37, p. 60]. Since there were only few incentives
24 For a detailed analysis of this cooperative committee see [28].
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the extensive regulatory procedure of risk assessment e
so far only 70 risk assessment reports have been ﬁnished
[14].25 The risk assessment reports end up with one of
the following conclusions for each report.
i. There is need for further information and/or testing.
ii. There is at present no need for further information
and/or testing or for risk reduction measures beyond
those which are being applied.
iii. There is need for limiting the risks: risk reduction
measures which are already being applied shall be
taken into account.
These conclusions are diﬀerent for risks for workers
and consumers, and are diﬀerent for health eﬀects in
general and environment.
Warhurst [49] provides an assessment of the data on
High Production Volume (HPV) substances:
In 1999, the ECB analyzed the data it had received from
industry on the properties of their HPV chemicals [1].
This study found that:
 Only 14% of the EU High Production Volume
Chemicals had data publicly available at the level
of the base-set;
 65% had some data but less than base-set;
 21% had no data.
Without this data it was impossible to assess which
chemicals were a priority for further evaluation in the
existing chemicals program, and unclear how industry
was managing to carry out its other responsibilities,
such as classiﬁcation and labelling chemicals and assess-
ing risks to workers. As a result of these studies a
Swedish government oﬃcial stated, ‘‘most substances
on the market are in reality not covered by the current
legislation’’ [13].
The risk assessment reports oﬀer a basis for risk re-
duction measures, but they give no advice about how
to reduce risks. An evaluation of the regulation shows
that for 34 out of 41 chemicals the reports conclude
with either (i) or (iii). Vis-a`-vis workers, the reports con-
clude in 70% of the cases that further risk reduction
measures are needed [10, p. 1041]. Comparing the sup-
posed risks, which led to the setting on the priority
list, with the found risks, underestimations have been
approximately three times more often than instances
of overestimations. Thus, the Type 1 errors e not regu-
lating a hazardous substance e has been signiﬁcantly
higher than Type 2 errors e regulating a non-hazardous
25 Indeed for 127 substances, there already exists a ﬁrst draft Risk
Assessment Report.substance. This strengthens the argument for adopting
risk reduction measures at an earlier stage of knowledge
in the conducting of risk assessment.
The Legal basis for restrictions of new as well as ex-
isting chemicals is the Council Directive 76/769/EEC, as
transposed into the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions
on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substan-
ces and preparations. Whereas the data collection and
assessment takes place under the authority of the EU
Environmental Directorate, the implementation of
restrictions is under the authority of the EU Internal
Market Directorate. As a consequence, the information
collected by the ﬁrst directorate is only partly used as
a basis for actions with regard to market restrictions.
As a result, most of the few procedures for market re-
strictions within the European Union are not initiated
by the European Commission, but by a single member
state.
In turn, the possibilities for national risk reduction
measures are restricted due to the European legal frame-
work. Before a national implementation, initiatives for
market restrictions have to be reported to the European
Commission. This can be a long process, especially, if
the Commission decides to aim at restrictions on the
European level. For these reasons, market restrictions
for chemical substances were a very rarely used instru-
ment on the national, as well as on the European level.
2.2. Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of
Chemicals (REACH)
Since Regulation 93/793 could not resolve the infor-
mation deﬁcit because of the slow risk assessment pro-
cess,26 the European Commission developed proposals
for a new regulation, which were published in 2003.27
The political process started with the publication of
the whitepaper in 2001 focusing on strategies for a future
chemicals policy. The new system is called REACH e
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemi-
cals.28 The main elements are uniform procedures of
registration and evaluation for new and existing chemi-
cals in place until 2012 and the transfer of responsibility
for producing and assessing data to the industry, as well
as the expansion of responsibilities to the downstream
users. As for new chemicals, the required data set de-
pends on the amount produced annually. Generally
the system is three-tiered. All chemicals produced in
higher amounts than 1 t/y have to be registered without
26 The failure of Regulation 93/793 has been analyzed and discussed
in both scientiﬁc and political contexts. For the former, see [50,51];
for the latter, see [15].
27 See [17,18].
28 See [16].
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assessment report is necessary for substances produced
in amounts over 10 t/y (ca. 15,000 substances). This re-
port contains not only data about substances’ properties
and exposure proﬁles, but also data about necessary risk
reduction measures that need to be taken to assure safe
application/use from the producer through the down-
stream users. A safety data sheet that also contains in-
formation about necessary risk reduction measures has
to be passed onto, and if necessary modiﬁed, within
the actors in the supply chain. All substances produced
in higher amounts than 100 t/y (ca. 10,000 substances)
and the substances which are produced in lower
amounts, but are suspected to be hazardous, will be
evaluated by the authorities after registration (ca. 5000
substances).29
In contrast to the well-deﬁned data requirements for
risk assessment, the responsibility for risk management
is deﬁned only cursorily and superﬁcially in REACH
(Article 13, 6)
Any manufacturer or importer shall identify and apply
the appropriate measures to adequately control the risks
identiﬁed in the chemical safety assessment, and where
suitable, recommend them in the safety data sheets
which he supplies in accordance with Article 29.
The function of this risk management element in
REACH highly depends on clear deﬁnition of ‘‘ade-
quate control’’ and sanctions for non-compliance. The
point of reference for adequate control seems to be the
determination and shortfall of the Probable No-Eﬀect
Concentration (PNEC) for the environment and the
Derived No-Eﬀect Level (DNEL) for human health.30
But so far, the consequences and sanctions31 for an ex-
ceeding PNEC and DNEL, respectively, are not quite
clear.32 Moreover, due to the negative incentives for the
enterprises to identify risks, control mechanism and
sanctions for inadequate registration dossiers are also
important and so far very limited.
Chemicals with certain hazardous properties must be
separately authorized. This includes substances which
can cause cancer or mutations or are toxic to reproduc-
tion (the so called CMR-substances), or are either per-
sistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (PBT), or very
persistent and very bioaccumulative (vPvB). For these
substances the burden of proof shifts from the
29 The authorities have to evaluate the underlying test plan of an en-
terprise for a substance, whereas other evaluations like completeness
and quality of the registration dossier are optional.
30 See REACH, Annex I.
31 In REACH, Title XIII sanctions are deﬁned very vaguely.
32 Apart from the authorization system, the legal opportunities to
restrict the marketing and use of a substance by the authorities where
essentially adopted from the existing regulatory framework (see
REACH, Title VIII).authorities to the producers, who are now in charge to
demonstrate the safety of a substance to get the autho-
rization. The authorization in turn does not automati-
cally take place for all, but only for safe applications.
In the latest version of the draft law, an authorization
(for production and use) is possible, if the risks of an
application can be ‘‘adequately controlled’’ or if the pro-
ducer is able to prove, that the socio-economic beneﬁt
exceeds the risks.33 These conditions create wide discre-
tion for the authorities.
The main motivation in revising the European chem-
icals policy is the past failure in mitigating the informa-
tion deﬁcit with regard to the existing chemicals. Despite
the planned changes of the new system, this approach
basically follows the path of ﬁrst solving the risk infor-
mation problem, before risk management can take
place. Nevertheless, due to the shift of responsibility
for the risk assessment to the industry this system is
argued to be more feasible than the existing regulation.
Moreover, the testing demands are more ﬂexible in com-
parison to the existing regulation that demands a very
comprehensive risk assessment. Identifying risk reduc-
tion measures is also integrated into the responsibility
of the producers and users of chemical substances. But
so far, this responsibility is described only very vaguely
in contrast to the detailed requirements of reporting
data about risk information. To guarantee, that the sys-
tem of controlled self-responsibility of industry with re-
gard to risk management works, it must be accompanied
by adequate control mechanisms and sanctions. Other-
wise, REACH will collect data about risk information
without signiﬁcantly forcing or encouraging risk reduc-
tion measures.
In principle, the Authorization system could establish
a new form of (regulatory) risk management, on the ba-
sis of the reversal of the burden of proof for substances
with certain properties. The system can be seen as the
embodiment of the precautionary principle, because
substances are to be screened for their possible potential
eﬀects and not only because risk has been scientiﬁcally
validated. How this system will work depends on the
form and application of this system by the authorities,
but the system has come under criticism [48,49]. The
wide discretion within the authorization system contains
the danger of not making use of the potentially available
precautionary approach in REACH. As past experience
shows, discretion has often weakened the application of
a regulation in practice (see also Section 2.3). Thus, to
ensure the application of the precautionary principle,
it is important to strengthen its requirements in the
authorization process.
33 However, a decision based on the socio-economic beneﬁt has also
to take into account existing safer alternatives. See REACH, Article
57, 3.
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In the United States the Toxic Substances Control
Act was passed in 1976 and confers the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) manifold rights to require
testing or reporting activities for new and existing chem-
icals and to regulate them.34 The main goals of TSCA
are receiving adequate data about the negative eﬀects
of chemical substances and regulating such substances,
which present or will present an ‘‘unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment’’.35 Negative im-
pacts for the economy and innovation should be
avoided by using the ‘‘least burdensome [regulatory]
requirements’’.
For new chemicals, a Premarket Manufacturing No-
tice (PMN) is required. Thereupon EPA decides on
a case-by-case basis if more tests are necessary, but
most often no new testing was required. Existing chem-
icals are registered in the ‘‘Inventory of Chemical Sub-
stances (ICS)’’, the United States equivalent to
EINECS. In contrast to the European union, where dif-
ferent inventories for new and existing chemicals exist,
the new substances are added to the ICS after the Pre-
market Manufacturing Notice (PMN) as well. The ICS
contains some 75,000 existing substances [22, p. 153].
Under TSCA, testing for existing chemicals is re-
quired by the establishment of testing rules for as
many as 50 chemicals per year following recommenda-
tions by the Interagency Testing Committee (ITC). On
this basis EPA requires tests from industry or EPA
has to justify why tests from their point of view are
not necessary. In practice, a relatively small number of
those rules were actually promulgated. In the ﬁrst 15
years of TSCA, the ITC proposed tests for 175 chemi-
cals to EPA, but EPA thereupon required testing from
industry for only 25 chemicals. For 34 other chemicals,
EPA and industry agreed on voluntary testing, and for 8
other chemicals, tests were only proposed [47]. In con-
trast to the European attempts to improve the legal
framework for existing chemicals, TSCA has not
changed substantially in this regard since its ﬁrst imple-
mentation. However, in the late 1990s, EPA did imple-
ment its High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge
34 See [7, 193ﬀ].
35 In the early implementation years of TSCA (1976e1980), EPA
adopted a risk-driven approach to existing chemicals by constructing
diﬀerent classes of chemicals based on production volume and toxicity.
This was seen as a logical necessary ﬁrst step on the way to eﬃcient
regulation. This allegedly ‘‘rational’’ approach, which consumed
most of the resources of the EPA Oﬃce of Toxic Substances, left little
agency resources for actually promulgating regulations. This ultimately
led to an essential failure of TSCA to live up to expectations. A
‘‘death blow’’ was delivered in 1991 by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in rejecting EPA’s attempt to ban asbestos, perhaps the most
notorious and well-acknowledged carcinogenic chemical substance in
commerce (see Footnote 36).Program under which chemical companies have begun
to voluntarily provide test data on 2800 chemicals pro-
duced in amounts greater than 1 million pounds per
year, although they have not agreed to test 300 of the
chemicals originally on the HPV list [43].
TSCA also requires the ﬁrms to deliver new informa-
tion about hazards of the produced substances to EPA.
EPA has to be notiﬁed of ‘‘signiﬁcant new uses’’ of reg-
istered chemicals, as well. It is within the administrative
discretion of EPA to determine what constitutes signiﬁ-
cant new uses. Along the lines of German/European
law, EPA has also the right to require a toxicity analysis
of existing chemicals, if an ‘‘unreasonable risk’’ is sup-
posed. The basis for risk reduction measures in TSCA
is the existence of an unreasonable risk. It is not the in-
tention of TSCA to prevent any risk, but to take into ac-
count the beneﬁts as well as risks of a substance. In fact,
only few chemicals are restricted by TSCA. Within the
ﬁrst 20 years of the passage of TSCA, limitations were
determined only for 17 substances [47, p. 185]. As of
2005, only ﬁve chemicals or classes of chemicals: poly-
chlorinated biphenyls, fully halogenated chloroﬂuoroal-
kanes, dioxin, asbestos36 and hexavalent chromium were
restricted or banned comprehensively. In conclusion,
although the opportunities for the authorities available
to EPA under TSCA are very comprehensive, EPA essen-
tially did not use the variety of available options for
requiring data and for minimizing risks in the past. TSCA
could truly be described as a ‘‘paper tiger.’’ Given the
36 The regulation for asbestos was nulliﬁed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals [Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA 947 F.2d 1201 (5th
Cir.1991)]. TSCA requires EPA to consider, along with the toxic eﬀects
on human health and the environment, ‘‘the beneﬁts of such sub-
stance[s] and mixture[s] and the availability of substitutes for such
uses.(emphasis added)’’. Because EPA did not explore regulatory
options other than a ban, and more speciﬁcally, because EPA did
not evaluate the toxicity (and costs) of likely substitute products in
a search for ‘‘least burdensome requirements’’, the court vacated the
proposed standard and remanded it to EPA for further proceedings.
While arguably the court incorrectly interpreted TSCA’s requirements
as to mandating substitutes’ toxicity (and cost) comparisons e and
could have sought the regulation in another circuit court to give
a more favorable result e the EPA chose not to attempt to reinstate
the asbestos ban, primarily because of the likely extensive burden on
agency resources to perform extensive risk and economic assessments
for substitutes. For all intents and purposes, EPA regards TSCA as
a ‘‘dead letter’’. There is a danger that REACH suﬀers the same
fate, with the result that regulation (authorization and restrictions) is
not often vigorously pursed. Note, as discussed earlier, that compara-
tive assessment of risks and costs are not nearly as burdensome as con-
ducting separate risk and cost assessments. Whether using comparative
assessment could circumvent the hurdle EPA needs to overcome to sat-
isfy the requirements laid out in Corrosion Proof Fittings needs to be
explored. Because the issue of alternatives needs to be considered in
formulating regulations under TSCA, this may well be possible. In
contrast, because risk assessment seems to drive the REACH process,
and because the consideration of alternatives seems to come in later,
whether the use of comparative analysis in the context of REACH
can circumvent the need for extensive risk analyses is unclear.
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is a legitimate concern thate although containing diﬀerent
risk management elements e it could suﬀer a similar fate.
2.4. The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
In addition to the testing rules for existing chemicals,
there are other mechanisms which focus on the public
disclosure of hazardous expositions in terms of releases,
mainly represented by the Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI). TRI is part of the federal Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), which
was established in 1986.37 The implementation of EP-
CRA can be seen as a reaction of the chemical accident
in Bhopal, India, where several thousand people were
killed and hundred of thousands were injured due to
releases of methyl isocyanate. The main purpose of
EPCRA ‘‘is to inform communities and citizens of
chemical hazards in their areas.’’ EPCRA requires cer-
tain industries to announce the releases and transfers
of certain chemical substances to air, water, land or
transferred oﬀ-site. The data have to be brought in via
a standardized form and are collected by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) in the Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI) which is publicly available.38 The
amount of chemicals which are covered has meanwhile
doubled since 1987 to about 650 chemicals.
TRI covers ﬁrms that have more than 10 employees
and that produce, manufacture or import over 25,000
pounds per year, or use 10,000 pounds per year of these
chemicals. For some persistent, bioaccumulative and
toxic chemicals (PBT) EPA lowered the reporting
thresholds in 1999 to 100 pounds, for highly persistent
and highly bioaccumulative chemicals to 10 pounds
and for dioxin and dioxin-like compounds to 0.1 g [42,
p. 1]. All facilities of the manufacturing sector and sev-
eral other industries are required to deliver data, thus
6100 facilities are charged to report their releases. Alto-
gether, approximately 6e7% of all chemical releases are
subject of TRI. Apart from the reporting requirements
for chemicals releases, EPCRA itself does not include
any other regulatory measures.39 The costs of complying
37 The reporting requirements for TRI can be found in EPCRA, Sec-
tion 313. Apart from TRI, EPCRA also includes three other legislative
parts: emergency planning, emergency release notiﬁcation, and hazard-
ous chemical storage reporting requirements. See [20].
38 The data can be found on EPA’s webpage: http://www.epa.gov/tri/.
39 The 1990 Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) represents a stricter
movement from pollution control to pollution prevention. The PPA
augments EPCRA and adds further requirements related to pollution
prevention activities to industrial reporting. Firms are asked to report
source reduction activities they are undertaking and additional data
about their waste management practices. The list of substances
required to be reported as ‘‘releases’’ has also been expanded. Very
few pollution prevention activities have in fact resulted from the
PPA requirements.with TRI mainly consist in the working hours needed
within the ﬁrms to provide the data. These costs amount
about $475 million a year. For the role for PBT-substan-
ces in 2000 the costs are estimated with $147 million in
the ﬁrst reporting year 2000, and $81.6 in the subsequent
years.40 These costs do not include further indirect costs
of TRI for the ﬁrms. The administration costs for EPA
are estimated as relatively low.
Our assessment of TRI mainly focuses on two issues:
(1) whether the TRI-data represent a good indicator of
ﬁrms’ environmental performance, and (2) whether the
TRI-data were treated as if they were a good indicator
of ﬁrms’ environmental performance, revealed by the
ﬁrms’ direct reaction as well as to reactions of other
stakeholders that resulted in a change of the ﬁrms’
behaviour.
2.4.1. Limits of TRI
The purpose of TRI is to overcome part of the infor-
mation deﬁcit with regard to the present hazards of
chemicals by informing the public. The potential power
of TRI depends on quality and quantity of the data, as
well as the capacity of the public to understand and in-
terpret the data. More available information does not
necessarily mean increased knowledge. ‘‘If information
is not provided in a clear and useable form, it may actu-
ally make people less knowledgeable than they were
before, producing over-reactions, or under-reactions,
based on an [in]ability to understand what the informa-
tion actually means [38, p. 626].’’
First, considering the quantity of existing chemicals
that are covered, TRI focuses only on the releases of
chemicals from manufacturing plants and does not in-
clude the whole life cycle of a product. Moreover, only
6e7% of all releases are covered. A reported reduction
in chemical releases does not necessarily mean a total re-
duction of releases but could also be a result of shifts in
releases from covered to not covered chemicals. Since
there is little knowledge vis-a`-vis the existing chemicals,
it is diﬃcult to estimate whether TRI covers the most
hazardous chemicals. Moreover, the ﬁrms are not re-
quired to produce risk information about the covered
substances, but only have to report their releases. In
addition, within the covered substances, no diﬀerence is
made between the diﬀerent severity (i.e., health or envi-
ronmental consequences) of releases. With regard to the
quality of the data, all hazards of the reported chemicals
are equally treated e apart from the recent exception of
the persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic chemicals. By
only looking on the total amount of releases, the widely
varying risks of hazardous substances are not factored
in. No matter which releases were reduced, they were
40 See [36, p. 9].
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ous. The total decrease in all releases, can nevertheless
increase the releases of more hazardous chemicals and
thus increase the total risks [46].
This is also true for diﬀerent types of releases. A shift
from one emission type to another can also cause more
problems, although the total amount of releases remains
equal or is decreasing. Moreover, TRI does not require
a uniform reporting system, and ﬁrms are also allowed
to change their reporting system in time. Several exam-
ples show that a ﬁrm can create paper reductions of sub-
stances’ releases by changing the reporting system,
although the releases have not decreased. Thus reported
reductions can partly be attributed to changes in report-
ing methods [46]. By taking all these limitations of TRI
into account, the potential power of the data is very
doubtful. Neither is it clear that all relevant releases
are covered, nor that the reduction of reported releases
also means a real decrease in releases on the one hand
and a decrease in risks due to hazards on the other hand.
2.4.2. Eﬀects of TRI
Although there are limitations to consider the TRI-
data as a good environmental indicator, the publication
of the data appeared to have an enormous positive im-
pact on the reduction of reported releases. During the
period from 1988 to 2001 on- and oﬀ-site releases of
the core chemicals were reduced by 54.5% while the pro-
duction increased. 39.6% of the decrease was already
reached by 1995 (EPA [42]). Actually, while emissions
to air and water decreased, there were corresponding in-
creases in hazardous waste. Due to the fact that hazard-
ous waste may be more problematic than the decreased
emissions, the success of TRI is far from clear.
According to EPA, the TRI-data are widely used by
the industry itself, the government, communities, public
interest groups, the stock market, insurance companies,
consultants, etc. [20]. The data are used to evaluate and
improve ﬁrms’ environmental performance, to set pres-
sure on ﬁrms, to localize further regulatory call for ac-
tion, to educate the public about hazards in their
neighbourhoods, etc. Due to the fact that the ﬁrms are
only required to report their releases without any further
regulatory requirements, it is important to explore the
factors that have caused the (reported) reductions.
Konar and Cohen [29] show in their study that the stock
market reacts on unexpected high releases of ﬁrms within
the ﬁrst publication of TRI-data in 1989 with decrease in
abnormal stock value. This does not mean that the worst
performing facilities also experienced the highest stock
decreases, because the stock market could have expected
that in advance because of reports in the media and there-
fore has already reacted [29, p. 13]. But all of the ﬁrms
with abnormal stock decreases were in the upper third
of polluting ﬁrms. These ﬁrms with the worst stock mar-
ket reaction, thereupon decreased their TRI-releasessigniﬁcantly to a larger extent than the average perform-
ing ﬁrms. Thus it can be concluded that the stock market
incorporates and evaluates TRI-data as an indicator for
environmental performance or for the eﬃciency of ﬁrms.
Firms with high releases are supposed to be vulnerable
with regard to costs to comply with potential future
environmental regulations or are considered not to be
organized eﬃciently. As a reaction, these ﬁrms have
a higher incentive to improve their TRI-performance
for being better evaluated by the stock market. It is
not clear if this is more than a one-time eﬀect with an ex-
pected decreasing signiﬁcance in time.
Furthermore, the representation of workers in envi-
ronmental management within ﬁrms plays an important
role. The more worker representatives are involved in
ﬁrms’ decisions, the more the ﬁrms tend to reduce the
reported releases (see [11, p. 9]). In contrast, there are no
empirical ﬁndings for a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the public
to push ﬁrms in decreasing their releases (see [31]). How-
ever, this could be also due to the diﬃculties in measur-
ing this correlation.
2.5. The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act
(TURA)
The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act
(TURA) was passed in 1989 with the goal to reduce
the use of hazardous substances by 50% by 1997
(Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Institute [41,
p.1-1]). ‘‘TURA is a ‘‘planning tool’’ for more eﬃcient
industrial operations that would produce less waste’’
[41]. It requires facilities to report their releases of toxic
substances along the lines of EPCRA. But under TURA
over 1400 chemicals are subject to reporting,41 although
only 250 of the listed chemicals are relevant for
Massachusetts.42 Over 1000 facilities took part in the
program at the beginning, where today only about
600 are left. The others mostly quit using the reported
chemicals [41,27].
In contrast to EPCRA, TURA also contains two
essential extensions: TURA not only requires data about
chemical releases but also about chemical use. Thus,
TURA demands a mass balance of toxic substances for
the whole production process. Furthermore, TURA re-
quires facilities ‘‘to undergo a planning process to iden-
tify opportunities for toxics use reduction’’ [41, p. 1-1].
41 All of the substances on the federal Toxics Release Inventory (TRI)
under Section 313 of the federal Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know (EPCRA) are regulated. Also, substances found on the
federal Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation
Liability Act (CERCLA) list are subject to TURA reporting and plan-
ning, except for chemicals that are delisted.
42 Other states like New Jersey or Oregon have also implemented sim-
ilar mandatory programs, but TURA is seen as the most ambitious.
See [27].
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tion prevention actions they are currently taking, it calls
ﬁrms to focus on future alternatives by asking not only
what they have been doing, but also what they could do,
to reduce the use and releases of hazardous substances.
Firms have to prepare a Toxics Use Reduction Plan to
show how toxic chemicals are used and how they could
be reduced within the whole life cycle (this is the essence
of Technology Options Analysis):
‘‘Each plan must provide a corporate policy statement
and two- and ﬁve-year goals for by-product reduction
of each listed chemical. In addition, each plan must in-
clude information about current and projected toxic
chemical use, the technical feasibility of implementing
various techniques, and the economic impacts of each
technique; a description of each technique or procedure
that is to be implemented; and a schedule for implemen-
tation’’ [41].
Basic toxic use reduction techniques are: input substi-
tution, product reformulation, production unit redesign
or modiﬁcation, production unit modernization and im-
proved operation and maintenance [41]. The costs of the
regulation between 1990 and 1997 have been estimated
to be $76.6 Million (including fees the ﬁrms have to
pay) according to calculations of the Massachusetts
Toxics Use Reduction Institute, whereas the beneﬁts
only for the ﬁrms have been savings of $90.5 Million.
This sum does not include environmental and health
beneﬁts (see [41, p. ES-5]).
As a result of including the whole production process
of toxic substances and focussing on future options,
Massachusetts is seen as the most successful state of the
United States with regard to reducing use and releases
of toxic substances. Comparable success can be found
e.g., in New Jersey, where similar regulations took place.
Between 1990 and 2000 the reporting facilities have re-
duced the use of toxic substances by 45%, by-products
and waste per unit of products by 69% and releases by
92%. Toxics shipped in products were reduced by 60%
[41]. Thus, the success of TURA in reducing hazardous
substances within the whole production process is much
more far-reaching than for TRI. Furthermore, ﬁrms
were able to save money by implementing safer alterna-
tives into the production process, thus the costs of
TURA already appear to be exceeded by the beneﬁts.
2.6. TRI and TURA: opportunities and limitations
Despite the limits of the TRI-data, they seem to be
widely recognized as an indicator for ﬁrms’ environmen-
tal performance. Thereby especially the stock market
and the workers representation have a signiﬁcant impact
on the decrease of the reported ﬁrms’ releases. Thus, the
disclosure of hazardous releases can be a potentially
powerful tool. Therefore, it seems to be useful toincrease the potential power of TRI by improving quan-
tity as well as quality of the data (see for example [39]).
With regard to the quantity, TURA shows the way by
focusing on the whole production process. Moreover,
more ﬁrms and substances could be subject to TRI.
Improving the quality of the data means, among
other things, the distinction between the varying degree
of severity of hazardous substances. This is combined
with increasing complexity for the processing of the
data, as well as the public capacity to interpret the
data. ‘‘However, too much information can produce
cognitive overload and lower the eﬀectiveness of disclo-
sure’’ [39]. It is also important for the quality of the data
to establish a unique reporting standard. Otherwise
ﬁrms have an incentive to use the reporting standard
to reduce their releases on the paper. Basically it is im-
portant to ask whether it is possible to create a compre-
hensive information system at acceptable costs that
adequately measures diﬀerent environmental perform-
ances of ﬁrms. Otherwise it could be useful to focus
on other measures to reduce risks. Looking at the actual
costs of TRI, a further extension of its application to
other chemicals may not be as useful as other initiatives.
In contrast, the tools implemented by TURA are in-
expensive and also cost-eﬀective for the ﬁrms. One of
the key success factors of TURA in this regard e apart
from the extension of requirements for the delivered
data to the whole production process e was the focus
on identifying future technological options to reduce
hazardous substances. By requiring the ﬁrms to make al-
ternatives explicit, it increases ﬁrms’ capacities to ﬁnd
solutions to reduce risks and save money at the same
time. Thus, TURA seems to be a successful informational
tool to encourage risk reduction measures. It is arguable
that there are limits to the amount of chemicals a system
like TURA is able to handle in this comprehensive man-
ner. However, if one assumes that the total number of
chemicals that actually present signiﬁcant toxic expo-
sures are of the order of a few thousand or less, the
TURA approach could well be suﬃcient.
3. Conclusions
In this paper we argued for a more synchronized risk
management process, as well as for the application of in-
formational risk management tools, especially if regula-
tory risk management measures are not likely to be
enforced. Diﬀerent kinds of information are useful for
all stages of risk management. For existing chemicals,
there is both a lack of knowledge about hazards (risk)
and a lack of regulatory risk reduction measures. In
this context, informational tools as a complement of
risk management, can be helpful to encourage ﬁrms to
reduce risks. Therefore, the simultaneous promotion of
ﬁrms’ public disclosure, on the one hand, and capacity
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the other hand, as applied in Massachusetts seems to be
a promising approach. In particular, learning from
TURA could help to force the planned risk management
elements under REACH.
In contrast, the European reorganization of chemi-
cals policy continues to focus on a solution driven
mainly by addressing the lack of knowledge about risk
with regard to the existing chemicals. The essential fail-
ure of TSCA in the United States should awaken the EU
authorities to the possibilities of a similar result. Indeed
there are some important novel elements of REACH,
e.g., the responsibility shift from the authorities to the
industry and the integration of identiﬁcation of risk re-
duction measures in the safety assessment report; and
the authorization system could possibly oﬀer a promis-
ing tool with regard to the improvement of risk manage-
ment. But to be eﬀective, these elements highly depend
upon aggressive interpretation and implementation by
the EU. If this turns out not to be the case, it is very likely
that REACH will mainly result in the collection of data
about risk, and the risk reduction opportunities will re-
main greatly underutilized.
In ﬁnalizing REACH, serious consideration should
be given to replacing the sequential process involving
the production of risk assessment data and analysis,
followed by authorization, by a more synchronized and
iterative process. The production of risk information
necessary for risk assessment, on the one hand, and
the search for safer alternatives on the other hand,
should be approached simultaneously in two parallel
quests. Overcoming deﬁcits in hazard-related informa-
tion and knowledge about risk reduction alternatives
must take place in a more synchronized manner than
is implicit in REACH.
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